What’s in Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Referendum? – The Diplomat

On June 5, Kazakhs will vote on a package deal of reforms supposed to transform the country from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a robust parliament.”

Six months after Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev referred to as protesters terrorists and requested assist from the Russian-backed Collective Safety Treaty Group to quell mass unrest, residents will participate in a referendum on constitutional reforms. 

The vote will take place on June 5, only one month after the proposed reforms were launched. The reform package deal addresses 33 separate articles – about one third of the overall constitutional articles – and was developed by a working group that Tokayev established in March. The reforms are said to transform Kazakhstan from a super-presidential system to a “presidential system with a robust parliament,” per Tokayev’s state of the union handle on March 16.

A brilliant-presidential system is one the place parliaments and courts are solely nominally unbiased, and the president and their administration have practically limitless control over political decision-making. Kazakhstan’s first step to a super-presidential system was the adoption of a brand new constitution in 1995 that was pushed by Nursultan Nazarbayev after dissolving an uncooperative parliament. Nazarbayev further consolidated his personal powers with constitutional amendments in 1998, 2007, and 2011.

Nazarbayev began to loosen the president’s control with constitutional amendments in 2017 that barely redistributed presidential powers to other branches of government and opened the path for the election of native representatives, not less than at the village stage. However, Nazarbayev slyly maintained his personal control over Kazakhstan’s politics by together with provisions that protected him as “elbasy,” or leader of the nation.

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The proposed constitutional reforms strip the constitution of mentions of elbasy and the First President of the Republic, which some see as a continued sign of the Nazarbayev household’s fall from grace. 

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Along with sidelining Nazarbayev, a number of proposed provisions would slightly limit the power of the president. The president shouldn't be a member of a political social gathering, which member of the working group Sara Idrysheva called “the bravest step of our esteemed president.” In anticipation of this modification, Tokayev stepped down as chairman of the Amanat get together – a rebranded version of Nazarbayev’s ruling Nur Otan celebration – on April 26. Additionally, the president can now not override the acts of akims of oblasts, major cities, or the capital and shut family members of the president cannot hold political posts.

Several proposed measures give parliament extra power vis-a-vis the president. Kazakhstan’s parliament will stay bicameral, however the distribution of energy between the upper and lower homes will shift somewhat. The Senate will not have the ability to make new legal guidelines, and as a substitute will just approve or reject legal guidelines handed by the Mazhilis. Moreover, the process for choosing deputies to each houses will change. 

First, the Mazhilis can be reduced to 98 deputies, following the abolition of nine seats appointed by the Meeting of the Peoples of Kazakhstan. These seats might be transferred to the Senate, and the Meeting of the Peoples will now only get to nominate five deputies. The variety of deputies appointed by the president will probably be diminished from 15 to 10.

Second, Mazhilis deputies shall be elected in response to a mixed system. Seventy % of Mazhilis deputies will likely be chosen by proportional elections, and 30 % can be instantly elected.

The only proposed changes to the judicial system relate to the reestablishment of the Constitutional Court docket. Kazakhstan had a Constitutional Courtroom till the adoption of the 1995 structure, which instituted a weaker constitutional council. The president still maintains a robust affect over the Constitutional Court’s make-up, however, with the power to select the court docket’s chairman and 4 of the judges; parliament chooses the other three.

Tokayev has emphasised the importance of local governance, marked by the first-ever direct election of village akims and plans to introduce three new oblasts that may carry government bodies nearer to the populations they characterize. Perhaps essentially the most disappointing facet of proposed reforms is the lack of serious movement on local representation for residents of Kazakhstan’s largest cities. If the referendum passes, Kazakhstanis will get to vote for akims of oblasts, main cities, and the capital – however, the candidates can have been selected by the president. The suitable to elect local leadership has been some of the constant calls for from Almaty residents, and this try to create choice is in the end beauty.

The proposed reforms are essential steps towards real consultant government in Kazakhstan; nonetheless, they don't necessarily represent forward movement. Most of the amendments are merely reinstating mechanisms of checks on presidential energy that previously existed, slightly than materially altering the relationship between state and society, as Tokayev claims.